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AbstrAct: International criminal procedure combines elements of 
accusatorial and inquisitorial legal traditions, thus constituting a 
unique amalgam. Because of the broader scale and the complexity of 
international criminality to be addressed by international criminal courts 
and tribunals, it may seem interesting to look at developments and their 
hitherto experience through the lens of the admissibility of evidence. 
The presented paper scrutinizes the respective law and practice of the 
International Military Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunals for 
the former yugoslavia and for Rwanda, and the International Criminal 
Court, and also makes some general observations on the admissibility of 
evidence from the perspective of international judiciary as a whole, i.e. 
not only confined to international judicial bodies of a criminal character. 
Keywords: admissibility of evidence; international criminal courts and 
tribunals; international judiciary.
resumo: O processo penal internacional combina elementos das tradições 
acusatórias e inquisitórias, assim constituindo um paradigma único. Em razão 
da escala mais ampla e da maior complexidade da criminalidade internacional 
a ser enfrentada pelos Tribunais criminais internacionais, pode ser interessante 
observar os seus desenvolvimentos e históricos diante da temática da admis-
sibilidade probatória. Neste artigo pretende-se analisar a legislação e a prática 
dos Tribunais Internacionais Militares, os Tribunais Penais Internacionais para 
1 University Professor, Department of International and European Law, Faculty of 
Law, Administration and Economics, University of Wroclaw, Poland. PhD in Law.
162 | KRzAN, Bartłomiej.
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 1, p. 161-188, jan.-abr. 2021. 
a antiga Iugoslávia e para Ruanda, e o Tribunal Penal Internacional, além 
de apontar comentários gerais sobre admissibilidade da prova em uma 
perspectiva internacional ampla, ou seja, não somente limitada a órgãos 
judiciais internacionais de caráter penal.
PAlAvrAs-chAve: admissibilidade da prova; tribunais penais internacionais; 
justiça internacional.
introduction
Evidence may be described “as a tool for the reconstruction 
of disputed past events in the context of judicial trials”2. The term 
admissibility is “distinctly Anglo-American in origin, and has a technical 
significance not applicable to the broad rules of international procedure”3. 
Of course, admissibility may have different meanings in different criminal 
justice systems. Whereas in common law systems the respective scope of 
potential understandings is much broader, including issues of relevance 
and the probative value of the information, in civil law inadmissibility 
would normally be related with improperly obtained evidence4. When in a 
common law criminal trial a judge is to filter the available information that 
may be offered to a jury, by deciding on its admissibility, the counterpart 
role of a professional judge in civil law systems is to try the facts. This is 
yet just one reflection of indeed the different roles assigned for judges, 
prosecutors, and even defendants in accusatorial and inquisitorial systems.
The present analysis attempts at examining the respective 
developments concerning the admissibility of evidence in international 
criminal justice. Unsurprisingly, the combination of the two distinct 
2 MURPHY, Peter. Evidence, Proof, and Facts - A Book of Sources. Oxford: OUP, 
2003, p. 1.
3 SANDIFER, Durward V. Evidence Before International Tribunals. Chicago: The 
Foundation Press, 1939, p. 120.
4 SWART, Bert. International criminal courts and the admissibility of evi-
dence. In: THAKUR, R. Chandra; MALCONTENT, Peter (eds.). From Sover-
eign Impunity to International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World 
of States. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004, p. 136.
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procedural systems, and the underlying differences in terms of approaching 
evidence is worth analyzing, especially against the background of the 
relevant practice by the international criminal judiciary. It is to address 
international criminality with a complexity not comparable to ordinary 
crimes5. Hence, in any respect the scale of offences to be prosecuted, as 
well as the quantity of potential evidentiary sources, affect the operation 
of proceedings, thus making them incomparable to any domestic criminal 
proceedings6. For that reason our analysis starts with looking at the 
normative frameworks and their application by International Military 
Tribunals, the ad hoc Tribunals established by the Security Council, 
namely the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
and finally by the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Subsequently, the troubling combination of adversarial and inquisitorial 
elements is assessed against the background of proceedings before them. 
Yet, any reliable examination would be incomplete without then paying 
attention to the general approach to evidence by international courts, 
also those of a non-criminal character. It may be claimed that only after 
taking all those considerations into account, an accurate picture on 
the admissibility of evidence before international criminal courts and 
tribunals may be provided.
1. intErnational Military tribunals
The roots of modern international criminal justice date back 
to the establishment of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) and 
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. The apparently greatest difficulty 
in establishing the operational framework consisted in how to reconcile 
5 DRUMBL, Mark A. Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, Cambridge: 
CUP 2007, p. 157.
6 See e.g. OSIEL, Mark. Making Sense of Mass Atrocity, Cambridge: CUP 2009, 
pp. 106 ff; COGAN, Jacob Katz. The Problem of Obtaining Evidence for In-
ternational Criminal Courts, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 22, no. 2, 2000, pp. 
404ff.
164 | KRzAN, Bartłomiej.
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 1, p. 161-188, jan.-abr. 2021. 
two very different systems of procedure7. The statutes of the International 
Military Tribunals referred only cursorily to evidentiary issues. Article 
19 of the IMT Charter provided that: “The Tribunal shall not be bound 
by technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest 
possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit 
any evidence which it deems to be of probative value”. Article 13(a) of 
the IMTFE Charter was framed in a similar manner, with an additional 
sentence on admissibility of “all purported admissions or statements of 
the accused”. With regard to the proceedings before the latter Tribunal, 
in his dissenting opinion, Justice Pal levelled severe criticism in the 
following words: “In prescribing the rules of evidence for this trial 
the Charter practically discarded all the procedural rules devised by 
the various national systems of law, based on litigious experience and 
tradition, to guard a tribunal against erroneous persuasion, and thus 
left us, in the matter of proof, to guide ourselves independently of any 
artificial rules of procedure”8. There were no specific provisions in 
the IMT and IMTFE Charters on the exclusion of illegally obtained or 
improperly obtained evidence. 
With regard to International Military Tribunals, it may be 
therefore questioned whether the malleability of the evidentiary rules 
provided a potential for abuse, because of their flexibility expanding 
beyond the bounds of fairness9. Some learned commentators, however 
opined that the relaxation of the rules of evidence did not lead to 
“any unsatisfactory consequences” and “no question [could] ever be 
raised concerning the fairness of the rules of evidence and procedure 
7 TAYLOR, Telford. The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir. 
London: Bloomsbury 1993, p. 64 referring to Justice Jackson’s distraction. Cf. 
ZAHAR Alexander; SLUITER, Goran. International Criminal Law: A Critical 
Introduction. Oxford: OUP, 2008, p. 351.
8 Judgment of The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Pal, member from India, § 280 [reprint-
ed in:] BOISTER, Neil; CRYER, Robert (eds.). Documents on the Tokyo Inter-
national Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments. Oxford: OUP 
2008, p. 932.
9 WALLACH, Evan J. The Procedural and Evidentiary Rules of the Post-World 
War II Crimes Trials: Did They Provide an Outline for International Legal 
Procedure. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law Vol. 37, 1999. p. 869.
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administered by the Nuremberg Tribunal”10. Be that as it may, for many 
years the practice of the International Military Tribunals had been the 
only available reference point in international criminal justice, before 
the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.
2. thE ad hoc intErnational criMinal tribunals
Also, the ad hoc international criminal tribunals adopted lenient 
and flexible admissibility rules on evidence. The Statutes of the ICTY 
and ICTR conferred on the judges the adoption of “rules of procedure 
and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, 
trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims 
and witnesses and other appropriate matters”11. The judge-made Rules 
provided for admission by the Trial Chambers of “any relevant evidence 
which it deems to have probative value”12. At a later stage, however, the 
chamber could exclude such evidence13. The adopted rules of evidence 
were considered ‘unique’ by being “not simply a hybrid of the civil and 
common law systems” and replicating neither system14. 
10 GOODHART, Arthur L. The Legality of the Nuremberg Trials. In: 
METTRAUX, Guénaël. Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial. Oxford: OUP 
2008, pp. 628-629.
11 Art. 15 ICTY Statute, Art. 14 ICTR Statute.
12 Pursuant to respective Rules 89(C) of the ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, a Trial Chamber ‘may admit any relevant evidence which it 
deems to have probative value.’ 
13 ICTY and ICTR Rule 95 states that: ‘No evidence shall be admissible if ob-
tained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its ad-
mission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the 
proceedings.’ In addition, ICTY Rule 89(D) provides that: ‘A Chamber may 
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
need to ensure a fair trial.’ The ICTR RPE lacked an analogous rule.
14 See MACDONALD, Gabrielle Kirk. Trial Procedures and Practices, in 
MACDONALD, Gabrielle Kirk; SWAAK-GOLDMAN Olivia. Substantive 
and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law: The Experience 
of International and National Courts. Vol. 1, The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000, p. 556.
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In the first annual report of the ICTY, submitted by the President 
of the Tribunal, Antonio Cassese noted that “[b]ased on the limited 
precedent of the Nürnberg and Tokyo trials, the statute of the Tribunal 
has adopted a largely adversarial approach to its procedures, rather than 
the inquisitorial system prevailing in continental Europe and elsewhere”15. 
Such an observation was followed by a notice that “there are […] important 
deviations from some adversarial systems”, mentioning among them the 
lack of any technical rules for the admissibility of evidence16 and that 
the Tribunal may order the production of additional or new evidence 
proprio motu17. It could be observed that the Tribunal’s jurisprudence 
reflected fully such a statement so that evidence was treated “much more 
in accordance with the civil law tradition of free proof” despite “paying 
lip service to the adversarial nature of the Tribunal’s proceedings”18. 
In the process of establishing the procedural rules for the ICTY, 
given the limitations arising from the conflict and the conditions in the 
former Yugoslavia, in particular the restricted possibilities of gaining access 
to documentary evidence in the process of an ongoing armed conflict, 
15 Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Com-
mitted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, dated 28 July 
1994, UN Doc. A/49/342, S/1994/1007, 29 August 1994, § 71.
16 Ibidem, § 72: “The first is that, as at Nürnberg and Tokyo, there are no tech-
nical rules for the admissibility of evidence. This Tribunal does not need 
to shackle itself to restrictive rules that have developed out of the ancient 
trial-by-jury system. There will be no jury sitting at the Tribunal, needing 
to be shielded from irrelevancies or given guidance as to the weight of the 
evidence they have heard. The judges will be solely responsible for weighing 
the probative value of the evidence before them. Consequently, all relevant 
evidence may be admitted to the Tribunal unless its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial (rule 89) or where the 
evidence was obtained by a serious violation of human rights (rule 95).
17 With respect to the latter point, the report continued: “This will enable the 
Tribunal to ensure that it is fully satisfied with the evidence on which its final 
decisions are based. It was felt that, in the international sphere, the interests 
of justice are best served by such a provision and that the diminution, if any, 
of the parties’ rights is minimal by comparison” (§ 73).
18 MURPHY, Peter. Excluding justice or facilitating justice? International crim-
inal law would benefit from rules of evidence. International Journal Evidence 
and Proof, Vol. 12, 2008, p. 13.
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it was submitted that “the International Tribunal could not be too strict 
about the criteria for the admissibility of evidence”. Accordingly, “it was 
considered that the inclusion of technical rules would only encumber 
the judicial process”19. For that reason, the Tribunals’ chambers had a 
broad discretion to decide on the admissibility, relevance, and probative 
value of evidence20. The respective sparseness in formulating of the rules 
on evidence is deliberate. Rather than it being accidental, the rules are 
drafted and applied to ensure maximum flexibility for chambers in their 
efforts to run fair and expeditious trials21.
Over time the practice of the ad hoc tribunals moved in the 
direction of a more active judicial role, despite the textual starting-point 
being very close to the adversarial model22. It was due to the fact that the 
quite frequent changes were adopted by the judges.
The Appeals Chamber in Aleksovski stated that: “The purpose of 
the Rules is to promote a fair and expeditious trial, and Trial Chambers 
must have the flexibility to achieve this goal”23. It is quite telling in that 
19 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Delalić et al., Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion for 
the Redaction of the Public Record, 5 June 1997, § 41.
20 AMBOS, Kai. International Criminal Procedure: “Adversarial”, “Inquisitorial” 
or Mixed? In: BOHLANDER Michael (ed.). International Criminal Justice: A 
Critical Analysis of Institutions and Procedures, London: Cameron May, 2007, 
p. 477. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on 
the Prosecution Motion Under Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning the Testimo-
ny of a Witness, 27 July 1999, § 40: “In general terms, the Rules establish a 
regime for the admission of evidence which is wide and liberal”.
21 BOAS, Gideon; BISCHOFF, James L.; REID Natalie L.; TAYLOR III, B. Don. 
International Criminal Law Practitioner Library: International Criminal Proce-
dure, Volume 3, Cambridge: CUP 2011, p. 336. BOAS, Gideon. Admissibility 
of Evidence Under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY: Devel-
opment of the “Flexibility Principle”. In: MAY, Richard et al. (eds.), Essays on 
ICTY Procedure and Evidence in Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald. Leiden: 
Brill, 2001, p. 263.
22 See KRESS, Claus. The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in 
Outline: Anatomy of a Unique Compromise. Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, Vol. 1, 2003, p. 612; MAY, Richard; WIERDA, Marieke. Trends in In-
ternational Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha, 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 37, 1999, p. 727
23 Aleksovski, AC, ICTY, Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissibility of 
Evidence, 16 February 1999, § 19.
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respect to refer to the early decision by the ICTY rejecting the motion by 
the Defence to exclude, to rule on the admission of (hearsay) evidence 
without actually hearing its content and explained that “This procedure, 
while possibly appropriate if trials before the International Tribunal were 
conducted before a jury, is not warranted for the trials are conducted 
by Judges who are able, by virtue of their training and experience, to 
hear the evidence in the context in which it was obtained and accord it 
appropriate weight. Thereafter, they may make a determination as to the 
relevance and the probative value of the evidence”24. 
The role of reliability in the admissibility decision may be 
considered controversial. Indeed, the hitherto jurisprudence (of the ICTY 
and the ICTR) offered incoherent visions as to the reliability of a piece 
of evidence being either relevant to its admissibility or as a matter to be 
considered when determining its weight25. It is worth stressing that the 
ICTR did not adopt Rule 89(D) permitting its Trial Chamber to “exclude 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to 
ensure a fair trial”. However, for both ad hoc Tribunals their RPEs offered 
also mandatory exclusion of evidence if “its admission was antithetical 
to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings” or if 
it had been obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on the 
reliability of the evidence26. 
3. thE intErnational criMinal court
A compromise between the common and civil law tradition 
needed to be also reached in negotiating the Statute of the permanent 
24 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion 
on Hearsay, 5 August 1996, § 17.
25 COMBS, Nancy. Evidence. In: SCHABAS, William A.; BERNAZ, Nadia (eds.). 
Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law. New York: Routledge, 
2011, p. 326. Cf. MAY, Richard; WIERDA, Marieke. International Criminal 
Evidence, Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2002, pp. 109-110.
26 See respective rule 95. Since the ICTR Trial Chambers could not rely on a 
solution similar to that provided in Rule 89(D) of the ICTY RPE they had to 
rely on Rule 95, whereas the ICTY preferred to make use of Rule 89(D). 
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International Criminal Court27 resulting in “a delicate combination of 
civil and common-law concepts of fair trial and due process”28. Yet, “the 
compromise in the Rome Statute was to eschew generally the technical 
formalities of the common law system of admissibility of evidence in 
favour of the flexibility of the civil law system, provided that the Court 
has discretion to ‘rule on the relevance or admissibility of any evidence”29.
When the International Law Commission discussed the 
establishment of the international criminal court, it was clear to that 
the rules of evidence were too complex to be dealt with in the Statute 
itself, and should therefore be left to be defined in a separate document30. 
During subsequent works a decision was taken that the Statute should 
only contain the fundamental principles governing evidence, and that 
the details, secondary and subsidiary rules should be further elaborated 
in the Rules, more easily amended than the Statute31 and allowing the 
Court to flexibly adopt rules according to its practice and requirements32. 
Unsurprisingly, the eventual Rome Statute is not replete with rules of 
evidence which have been dealt with in full detail in RPE adopted, however, 
by the Assembly of State Parties33.
Yet, Article 69 lays down some general principles serving, in the 
opinion of some authors, the traditional common-law function of the law 
27 FLETCHER, George P. The Interplay of International Criminal Law and Oth-
er Bodies of Law, The Influence of the Common Law and Civil Law Tradi-
tions on International Criminal Law. In: CASSESE, Antonio (ed.). The Oxford 
Companion to International Criminal Justice. Oxford: OUP, 2009. 
28 BRADY, Helen. The System of Evidence in the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. In: LATTANZI, Flavia; SCHABAS, William A. (eds.). Essays 
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Volume 1, Il Sirente, 
1999, p. 286.
29 PIRAGOFF, Donald K.. Evidence. in LEE, R.S. (ed.), The International Crim-
inal Court—Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Ardsley: 
Transnational Publishers, 2001, pp. 351 and 354. 
30 SCHABAS, William A. The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on 
the Rome Statute, Second Edition. Oxford: OUP, 2016, p. 1079.
31 PIRAGOFF, Donald K.; CLARKE, Paula. Article 69. In: TRIFFTERER, Otto; 
AMBOS, Kai (eds.). The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Third Edition. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016, p. 1722
32 1996 Preparatory Committee Report I, p. 60.
33 Rome Statute, Article 51.
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of evidence34. Again, the provision contains references to different legal 
traditions and also that of continental law. Under Article 69(3), it is for 
the parties to submit evidence relevant to the case. However, “[t]he Court 
shall have the authority to request the submission of all evidence that it 
considers necessary for the determination of the truth”. The language 
of the quoted provision might seem to at least partially relate to the 
inquisitorial model, but not in its most rigid form, since the judges are 
neither under a strict duty to determine the truth, nor remain passive 
arbiters to reflect the pure adversarial model35. 
The most straightforward provision referring to admissibility is 
Article 69(4): “The Court may rule on the relevance or admissibility of 
any evidence, taking into account, inter alia, the probative value of the 
evidence and any prejudice that such evidence may cause to a fair trial or 
to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a witness”. Article 69 belongs to 
Part 6 concerning the trial proceedings but under Rule 63(1) of the RPE, 
the rules of evidence, together with Article 69, shall apply in proceedings 
before all Chambers, thus clarifying the respective ambiguity36. 
A standard to exclude evidence has been included in Article 
69(7) of the Rome Statute. Accordingly, “Evidence obtained by means 
of a violation of this Statute or internationally recognized human rights 
shall not be admissible if: (a) The violation casts substantial doubt on 
the reliability of the evidence; or (b) The admission of the evidence 
would be antithetical to and would seriously damage the integrity of 
the proceedings”.
It might be rightly questioned whether the above formulation 
does not ‘make a mockery of human rights law as an indivisible set of 
34 ORIE, Alphons. Accusatorial versus Inquisitorial Approach in International 
Criminal Proceedings. In: CASSESE, Antonio; GAETA, Paola; JONES, John 
R.W.D. (eds.). The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Com-
mentary. Oxford: OUP, 2002, p. 1485.
35 KRESS, Claus. The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in 
Outline: Anatomy of a Unique Compromise. Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, Vol. 1, 2003, p. 612.
36 PIRAGOFF, Donald K.. Evidence. In LEE, R.S. (ed.), The International Crim-
inal Court—Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Ardsley: 
Transnational Publishers, 2001, p. 350.
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minimum legal standards.’37 Without doubt Article 69(7) provides for a 
model of non-automatic inadmissibility of illegally obtained evidence38. 
The fairness test would be the ultimate step to finally admit otherwise 
admissible evidence. The quoted provision focuses on the impact of 
the violation on the reliability of the evidence and the general integrity 
of the proceedings39.
Finally, the ICC, like its predecessors, is not bound by national 
rules of evidence40. Against this background it may be useful to refer to 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, where the Trial Chamber I concluded that “evidence 
obtained in breach of national procedural laws, even though those rules 
may implement national standards protecting human rights, does not 
automatically trigger the application of Article 69(7) of the Statute41. The 
mentioned provision may be considered “lex specialis, when compared 
with the general admissibility provisions set out elsewhere in the Statute 
and represents a clear exception to the general approach”42.
The Statute’s approach vis-à-vis the admission of evidence is to 
eschew most of the technical rules on admissibility in favour of a system 
of utmost flexibility43. For some, however, the ICC legal framework does 
37 ZAHAR Alexander; SLUITER, Goran. International Criminal Law: A Critical 
Introduction. Oxford: OUP, 2008, p. 382.
38 JASIŃSKI, Wojciech. Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence in Pro-
ceedings before International Criminal Courts. In: KRZAN, Bartłomiej (ed.). 
Prosecuting International Crimes: A Multidisciplinary Approach. Leiden-Bos-
ton: Brill, 2016, p. 217. Cf. FALLAH, Sara Mansour. The Admissibility of Un-
lawfully Obtained Evidence before International Courts and Tribunals, The 
Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. 19, 2020, p. 148.
39 Cf. Katanga, No. ICC-01/04-01/07-2635, § 39.
40 See e.g. Rome Statute, Art. 69(8): 8. When deciding on the relevance or ad-
missibility of evidence collected by a State, the Court shall not rule on the 
application of the State’s national law”; ICC RPE, Rule 63(5), The Chambers 
shall not apply national laws governing evidence, other than in accordance 
with article 21.
41 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Doc. No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1981, Decision on the 
Admission of Material from the ‘Bar Table’, 24 June 2009, § 36
42 Ibidem, §34. also Lubanga, No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1981, § 34; Katanga, No. 
ICC-01/04-01/07-2635, § 39 (lex specialis as compared to Art. 69 (4) ICCS).
43 GALLMETZER, Reinhold. The Trial Chamber’s Discretionary Power To 
Devise The Proceedings Before It And Its Exercise In The Trial Of Thomas 
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not constitute an improvement, since its law of evidence is “possibly even 
more obscure than that of the ad hoc tribunals” and contains some utterly 
contradictory elements44. All in all, the general admissibility standard of 
evidence is defined by three cardinal criteria45. Accordingly, relevance, 
probative value, and prejudice (probative value as weighed against any 
prejudicial effect on trial fairness) constitute a three-step approach to 
determine the admissibility of evidence other than oral evidence46. First, 
“the Chamber must ensure that the evidence is prima facie relevant to the 
trial, in that it relates to the matters that are properly to be considered by 
the Chamber in its investigation of the charges against the accused and 
its consideration of the views and concerns of participating victims”47. 
Subsequently, the Chamber must assess whether the evidence has, on a 
prima facie basis, probative value48. Finally, where relevant, the probative 
Lubanga Dyilo. In: STAHN, Carsten; SLUITER, Goran (eds.). The Emerging 
Practice of the International Criminal Court. Leiden: Brill, 2009. p. 507.
44 ZAHAR Alexander; SLUITER, Goran. International Criminal Law: A Criti-
cal Introduction. Oxford: OUP, 2008, p. 394, alluding to the combination of 
non-compellability of witnesses with a mandatory exclusionary rule for tes-
timonial evidence not subject to cross-examination (rule 68).
45 GOSNELL, Christopher. Admissibility of Evidence. In: KHAN, Karim A.A.; 
BUISMAN, Caroline; GOSNELL, Christopher (eds.). Principles of Evidence in 
International Criminal Justice, Oxford: OUP, 2010, p. 378. As confirmed in 
other proceedings, the Chamber is to ‘first assess the relevance of the mate-
rial, then determine whether it has probative value and finally weigh its pro-
bative value against its potentially prejudicial effect’ - see ICC, Trial Chamber 
II, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Deci-
sion on the Prosecutor’s Bar Table Motions, ICC-01/04-01/07, 17 December 
2010, § 14.
46 ICC, Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Corrigen-
dum to Decision on the admissibility of four documents, ICC-01/04-01/06-
1399-Corr, 21 January 2011, §§ 25ff.
47 ICC, Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Corrigen-
dum to Decision on the admissibility of four documents, ICC-01/04-01/06-
1399-Corr, 21 January 2011, § 27.
48 Ibidem, § 28. Cf. Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Doc. No. ICC-01/04-
01/07-717, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, 
§ 77 “According to article 69(4) of the Statute, probative value is one of the 
factors to be taken into consideration when assessing the admissibility of a 
piece of evidence. In the view of the Chamber, this means that the Chamber 
must look at the intrinsic coherence of any item of evidence, and to declare 
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value of the evidence must be weighed against its prejudicial effect49. 
Such a three-stage approach may often appear as being very artificial 
and unnecessarily cumbersome50 since it would impose indeed lengthy 
decisions on admissibility of evidence and as such those would not be 
indispensable according to the Statute or the Rules.
For the sake of clarity, it may be requested that questions of 
illegally obtained evidence should be reviewed at the stage of the admission 
of evidence and not during its assessment51. However, the Trial Chamber 
III decided in Prosecutor v. Bemba to admit prima facie before the start of 
the presentation of evidence, all statements of witnesses to be called to 
give evidence at trial and all the documents submitted by the prosecution 
in its list of evidence52. According to the Majority of the Judges “a ruling 
on admissibility is not a pre-condition for the admission of any evidence, 
as it only implies a prima facie assessment of the relevance of any material, 
on the basis that it appears to be a priori relevant to the case”53. 
inadmissible those items of evidence of which probative value is deemed pri-
ma facie absent after such an analysis”.
49 ICC, Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Corrigen-
dum to Decision on the admissibility of four documents, ICC-01/04-01/06-
1399-Corr, 21 January 2011, § 29. Observing that: ”Whilst it is trite to observe 
that all evidence that tends to incriminate the accused is also “prejudicial” to 
him, the Chamber must be careful to ensure that it is not unfair to admit the 
disputed material, for instance because evidence of slight or minimal proba-
tive value has the capacity to prejudice the Chamber’s fair assessment of the 
issues in the case”.
50 BITTI, Gilbert. Article 64. In: TRIFFTERER, Otto; AMBOS, Kai (eds.). The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Third Edition. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2016, p. 1619.
51 JASIŃSKI, Wojciech. Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence in Proceed-
ings before International Criminal Courts. In: KRZAN, Bartłomiej (ed.). Pros-
ecuting International Crimes: A Multidisciplinary Approach. Leiden-Boston: 
Brill, 2016, p. 202.
52 ICC, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, De-
cision on the admission into evidence of materials contained in the prose-
cution’s list of evidence, ICC-01/05-01/08-1022, 19 November 2010, §8. Cf 
Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-02/11), Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for 
Admission of Documentary Evidence, 10 June 2014, § 15.
53 ICC, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Deci-
sion on the admission into evidence of materials contained in the prosecu-
tion’s list of evidence, ICC-01/05-01/08-1022, 19 November 2010, § 10.
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The above admission into evidence of all items mentioned on 
the Revised List of Evidence was based on a “prima facie finding of 
admissibility”, without an item-by-item evaluation or giving reasons 
was subsequently reversed by the Appeals Chamber. According to the 
latter, the Trial Chamber has a choice between ruling on the relevance 
and/or admissibility of each item of evidence when it is submitted 
or deferring its consideration until the end of the proceedings, thus 
making it part of its assessment of the evidence when it is evaluating 
the guilt or innocence of the accused person54. The Appeals Chamber 
underlined that according to the last sentence of Article 74(2) of the 
Rome Statute a Trial Chamber may base its decision at the end of the 
trial only on evidence that was “submitted and discussed before it at 
the trial”55. In addition, according to the Appeals Chamber, the Trial 
Chamber “failed to effectively evaluate any potential prejudice that such 
evidence may cause to a fair trial, in particular Mr. Bemba’s right to a 
trial without undue delay”56. It has been also suggested in the doctrine57 
that instead of undertaking an admissibility test at all cost at the moment 
of submitting pieces of evidence58, it may be advisable to defer the 
Chamber’s assessment of the admissibility of evidence until deliberating 
54 ICC, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judg-
ment on the appeals of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and the Prosecutor 
against the decision of Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on the admission 
into evidence of materials contained in the prosecution’s list of evidence’’, 
ICC-01/05-01/08-1386, 03 May 2011, § 37.
55 Ibidem, § 45.
56 Ibidem, § 70.
57 AMBOS, Kai. Treatise on International Criminal Law: Volume III: International 
Criminal Procedure. Oxford: OUP, 2016, p. 449.
58 ICC, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Decision on 
the Prosecutor’s Bar Table Motions, ICC-01/04-01/07-2635, 19 December 
2010, § 15: There are no automatic grounds for exclusion in the Statute or 
the Rules. Instead, the Chamber has the discretion to weigh the probative 
value of each particular item of evidence against the potentially prejudicial 
effect of its admission. This is a balancing test which must be carried out 
on a case-by-case basis. The Chamber emphasises, however, that, although 
the applicable admissibility test allows the Chamber wide- discretion, the 
Chamber has no discretion in whether or not to apply the test. Before admit-
ting any item of evidence, the Chamber must be satisfied that the admissibil-
ity criteria have been met.
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its judgment pursuant to Article 74(2) of the Statute59. Accordingly, the 
preliminary admissibility exam would be limited to relevance60. Yet, 
the concept of relevance contains an implicit requirement of probative 
value. But when compared to the mechanisms available to the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals, the respective solution included in the 
Rome Statute seems too moderate.
One important aspect of the ICC procedure, and also on 
evidentiary aspects thereof, is that under Rome Statute the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence are to be adopted by the Assembly of State 
Parties and not by judges themselves. Such a mistrust in judges61 may 
also have more serious and definitely negative consequences, including 
the significant preclusion of the necessary judicial development, while 
restricting the judges substantially to a mechanical function, which 
in turn may affect the ability of the International Criminal Court to 
function efficiently as a court of law and the ability of its judges to 
fulfil their mandate62. Not only against the background of the ICC’s 
predecessors, such a deprivation cannot be considered a welcome 
development.
59 ICC, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judg-
ment on the appeals of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and the Prosecutor 
against the decision of Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on the admission 
into evidence of materials contained in the prosecution’s list of evidence’’, 
ICC-01/05-01/08-1386, 03 May 2011, §9: “The Chamber will consider the 
relevance, probative value and potential prejudice of each item of evidence 
submitted at that time, though it may not necessarily discuss these aspects 
for every item submitted in the final judgment”.
60 KLAMBERG, Mark. Evidence in International Criminal Trials. Leiden: Brill, 
2013, p. 357. Cf. SCHUON, Christine. The Appeals Decision in the ICC’s 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Case on the Trial Chamber’s ‘Decision on the 
Admission into Evidence of Materials Contained in the Prosecution’s List of 
Evidence’. Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, 2012, p. 520.
61 CASSESE, Antonio. The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some 
Preliminary Reflections. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, 1999, 
p. 163.
62 HUNT, David. The International Criminal. Court. High Hopes, ‘Creative Am-
biguity’ and an Unfortunate Mistrust in International Judges. Journal of Inter-
national Criminal Justice, Vol. 2, 2004, p. 56.
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4.  squaring inquisitorial law of EvidEncE in a 
prEdoMinantly advErsarial systEM?
Without doubt, rules of evidence, when applied consistently, 
are an essential component of fairness and good trial management63. 
The law and the respective practice of the judicial bodies analysed above 
offer numerous occasions to draw firm similarities, notwithstanding the 
differences between the International Military Tribunals, International 
Criminal Tribunals, and the permanent ICC. Comparing the experiences of 
those judicial institutions demonstrated various commonalities. Generally 
speaking, all of the surveyed international judicial bodies have had a 
flexible and liberal approach to the admission of evidence. 
Yet, the “free proof” may be “a euphemism for a systemic failure 
of judicial discrimination in admitting evidence without inquiring into 
its apparent provenance or reliability” and “the price of this failure is 
evidential contamination”64. 
It goes without saying that international criminal procedure 
may be portrayed as a competition of or a contest between two 
conflicting traditions of criminal procedure. In general, it may be 
concluded that the international criminal procedure is dominated by 
the common-law adversarial model but the international criminal courts 
and tribunals have been relying on essentially civil-law mechanisms 
for tendering and admitting evidence65. Thus, international criminal 
evidence rules constitute a unique amalgam. The trial proceedings are 
primarily common law in character but basic approach to evidence 
63 GOSNELL, Christopher. Admissibility of Evidence. In: KHAN, Karim A.A.; 
BUISMAN, Caroline; GOSNELL, Christopher (eds.). Principles of Evidence in 
International Criminal Justice, Oxford: OUP, 2010, p. 442.
64 MURPHY, Peter. No Free Lunch, No Free Proof: The Indiscriminate Admis-
sion of Evidence is a Serious Flaw in International Criminal Trials. Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, Vol. 8, 2010, p. 540.
65 KWON, O-Gon. The Challenge of An International Criminal Trial as Seen 
from the Bench. Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 5, 2007, pp. 
363–364, see also KRESS, Claus. The Procedural Law of the International 
Criminal Court in Outline: Anatomy of a Unique Compromise. Journal of In-
ternational Criminal Justice, Vol. 1, 2003, p. 612.
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derives from civil law systems, which when blended together provide 
for inevitable tensions66 . 
When assessing the international intersection of traditions, it is 
rightly feared that “the mishmash of the two system has abandoned some 
distinctive checks on which each system depends”67. In even stronger 
words it may be observed in a broader context that “the present system 
of ‘free proof’ in the context of international criminal law represents a 
judicial failure to exercise due discretion by indiscriminately admitting 
any material claimed by the parties to be ‘evidence’, regardless of its 
provenance or apparent reliability and even without inquiry as to possible 
perjury or fabrication”68. 
Against this particular background it may seem natural to advocate 
for fully choosing either system, for the selected law of evidence “can 
only function properly in their respective ‘natural habitats’, which is 
either the civil-law objective truth-finding contest or the common-law 
subjective truth finding contest”69.
It is thus logical that the representatives of the common law system 
level criticism against the missing elements. The “deviations” from the 
adversarial system are considered to frustrate its objective “by making 
trials longer, more complex, and less efficient, and by tending to bury 
the truly important evidence in the midst of an enormous accumulation 
of evidential debris.”70. Such “evidential debris” may be said to poison 
66 COMBS, Nancy. Evidence. In: SCHABAS, William A.; BERNAZ, Nadia (eds.). 
Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law. New York: Routledge, 
2011, p. 329.
67 BIBAS, Stephanos; BURKE-WHITE, William W. International Idealism Meets 
Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism. Duke Law Journal, Vol. 59(4), 2010, 
p. 695 (at p. 638 complaining that “in blending adversarial and inquisitorial 
systems, international criminal justice has jettisoned too many safeguards of 
either one”).
68 MURPHY, Peter. No Free Lunch, No Free Proof: The Indiscriminate Admis-
sion of Evidence is a Serious Flaw in International Criminal Trials. Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, Vol. 8, 2010, p. 539.
69 ZAHAR Alexander; SLUITER, Goran. International Criminal Law: A Critical 
Introduction. Oxford: OUP, 2008, p. 394.
70 MURPHY, Peter. Excluding justice or facilitating justice? International crim-
inal law would benefit from rules of evidence. International Journal Evidence 
and Proof, Vol. 12, 2008, p. 13.
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the record and ultimately make it more difficult for judges to assess the 
weight of the evidence and arrive at the truth71. In the alternative, it is 
also possible to argue against any repetition of the reliability assessment, 
when determining admissibility, and later at the final deliberations. Thus, 
procedural economy may as well be invoked as an argument in favour of 
flexible admission of evidence72. The latter suggestion may well fit into 
the international character of the judicial proceedings.
Some reaction to the referred objections is offered in the Separate 
and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese in Erdemović, which deserves 
to be quoted at length: “International criminal procedure results from 
the gradual decanting of national criminal concepts and rules into the 
international receptacle. […] It is therefore only natural that international 
criminal proceedings do not uphold the philosophy behind one of the 
two national criminal systems to the exclusion of the other; nor do they 
result from the juxtaposition of elements of the two systems. Rather, 
they combine and fuse, in a fairly felicitous manner, the adversarial or 
accusatorial system […] with a number of significant features of the 
inquisitorial approach […]. This combination or amalgamation is unique 
and begets a legal logic that is qualitatively different from that of each of 
the two national criminal systems: the philosophy behind international 
trials is markedly at variance with that underpinning each of those national 
systems. Also the Statute and Rules of the International Tribunal, in 
outlining the criminal proceedings before the Trial and Appeals Chambers, 
do not refer to a specific national criminal approach, but originally take 
up the accusatorial (or adversarial) system and adapt it to international 
proceedings, while at the same time upholding some elements of the 
inquisitorial system”73. In a similar vein, another ICTY President, Gabrielle 
Kirk MacDonald advocated for the flexibility of procedural and evidentiary 
71 MURPHY, Peter. No Free Lunch, No Free Proof: The Indiscriminate Admis-
sion of Evidence is a Serious Flaw in International Criminal Trials. Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, Vol. 8, 2010, p. 539.
72 KLAMBERG, Mark. Evidence in International Criminal Trials. Leiden: Brill, 
2013, p. 419.
73 Erdemovic - Judgement - Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, 
Erdemović (IT-96-22), AJ, 7 October 1997, §4.
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rules (“a framework, not a straitjacket”) to allow the exercise of judicial 
discretion where necessary74. 
Another perspective on the hybridization of the procedure, and 
the admissibility of evidence in particular, would be the perspective of 
the fair trial ideal75. One might be reminded of the famous reference to 
the “poisoned chalice” at Nuremberg76 that brilliantly covers the delicate 
interplay between being either too inclined pro-conviction or in the 
alternative, instead of overlooking rights of the accused to lurch in the 
opposite direction, with an eagerness to demonstrate unparalleled care 
for the accused, i.e. being inclined to acquittal at any cost77. 
In a more modern fashion, one might be tempted to rely once again 
on a learned expert of international (criminal) law. According to Cassese 
(acting then as dissenting Judge in his capacity as the ICTY President in 
another case), “notions, legal constructs and terms of art upheld in national 
74 Remarks made by Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, President of the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to the Prepara-
tory Commission for the International Criminal Court, ICTY Press Re-
lease JL/P.I.S./425-E (30 July 1999), https://www.icty.org/en/press/
remarks-made-judge-gabrielle-kirk-mcdonald-president-international-crim-
inal-tribunal-former (accessed on 5 December 2020).
75 Such philosophy of the criminal procedure was employed by ICTY in Delalić 
and others (IT-96-21-T), TC, 4 February 1998, Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Motion for an Order Requiring Advance Disclosure of Witnesses by the De-
fence, § 20: “The general philosophy of the criminal procedure of the In-
ternational Tribunal aims at maintaining a balance between the accusatory 
procedure of the common law systems and the inquisitorial procedure of the 
civil law systems; whilst at the same time ensuring the doing of justice. […] 
both the Statute and the Rules adhere strictly to the elementary principles of 
justice, and the protection of the essential rights of the accused”
76 On November 21, 1945, in the Palace of Justice at Nuremberg, Germany, 
Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States, made his 
opening statement to the International Military Tribunal and said: “To pass 
these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well. We 
must summon such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that 
this Trial will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity’s aspirations 
to do justice”.- see https://www.roberthjackson.org/speech-and-writing/
opening-statement-before-the-international-military-tribunal/ (accessed on 
5 December 2020).
77 See: https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-other-poisoned-chalice-unprecedented-evi-
dentiary-standards-in-the-gbagbo-case-part-1/ (accessed on 5 December 2020).
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law should not be automatically applied at the international level. They 
cannot be mechanically imported into international criminal proceedings. 
The International Tribunal, being an international body based on the law 
of nations, must first of all look to the object and purpose of the relevant 
provisions of its Statute and Rules”78.
This brings to light another element, which relies on the 
international nature of the judicial bodies admitting or not the 
information as evidence. Whereas the analysis above concentrated on 
procedural requirements referring to domestic experience, there might 
indeed be different combinations or hybrids between the adversarial 
and inquisitorial systems. Indeed, no single national system could 
offer a sufficient solution79. What becomes crucial at this point of our 
analysis is to now pay due attention to the international character of 
the proceedings before a judicial body operating outside the purely 
domestic context.
A seminal study on evidence in international proceedings 
concluded that “international tribunals would be seldom troubled with 
questions of reception or exclusion, based upon the intrinsic character 
of the evidence itself”80. According to M.O. Hudson, “No general rules 
have been developed to constitute an international law of evidence, 
and international tribunals are usually free from limitations of national 
tribunals in this regard”81. Apart from special provisions, international 
tribunals claim, and indeed exercise, complete freedom in the admission 
and evaluation of evidence in order to arrive at the moral conviction of 
78 Erdemovic, Judgement, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, 
Erdemović (IT-96-22), AJ, 7 October 1997, § 2.
79 ACQUAVIVA, GUIDO. Written and oral evidence. In: CARTER, Linda; PO-
CAR, Fausto (eds.). International Criminal procedure: The Interface of Civil 
Law and Common Law Legal Systems, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2013.
80 SANDIFER, Durward V. Evidence Before International Tribunals. Chicago: The 
Foundation Press, 1939, p. 119.Earlier in his treatise the mentioned author 
opines that “no rule of evidence thus finds more frequent statement in the 
cases than the one that international tribunals are not bound to adhere to 
strict rules of evidence.” (at p. 9).
81 HUDSON, Manley O. International Tribunals. Past and Future. Washington: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Brookings Institution, 
1944, p. 92.
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truth of the whole case82. A tendency in the practice of international 
tribunals is “to accept all possible means by which the disputed facts 
could be proved”83. Of course, one may be tempted to offer special 
treatment to newer international tribunals of a criminal character, to 
be distinguished from the traditional inter-state litigation84. In contrast 
to other international bodies, evidence plays a very prominent role in 
the decision-making by international criminal courts, as the latter are 
entrusted with determining the individual’s criminal responsibility and 
not the liability of States. But also, international criminal tribunals suffer 
from difficulties in securing state cooperation and access to evidence.
Therefore, despite the apparent differences, a general conclusion 
may be drawn that international tribunals, including criminal courts and 
tribunals, have generally had the power to decide for themselves what is 
admissible as evidence and have indeed taken a liberal approach to the 
matter85. It may be even claimed that free evaluation of evidence should 
be considered a general principle of international law86.
82 CHENG, Bin. General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals. Cambridge: CUP, 2006, p. 307. See also BROWER, Charles N. The 
Anatomy of Fact-Finding before International Tribunals: An Analysis and a 
Proposal Concerning the Evaluation of Evidence. In: LILLICH, Richard (ed.). 
Fact-Finding by International Tribunals. Ardsley-on-Hudson: Transnational 
Publishers, 1991, p. 148 (“By and large there are no rules of evidence applied 
in international proceedings that automatically would evaluate evidence for 
reliability and potentially exclude it. Usually anything offered is admitted. 
For obvious diplomatic reasons international tribunals are especially reluc-
tant to spurn anything proffered by a sovereign”). 
83 KAZAZI, Mojtaba. Burden of Proof and Related Issues: A Study on Evidence 
Before International Tribunals. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996, 
p. 186.
84 Due to differing functions, parties, and procedures of different tribunals, a 
general analysis of evidentiary practice is rendered difficult, but it is possible 
to identify some similar approaches to the international law of evidence – see 
RIDELL, Anna.Evidence, Fact-Finding, and Experts. In: ROMANO, Cesare 
P.R.; ALTER, Karin; SHANY, Yuval (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Interna-
tional Adjudication. Oxford: OUP, 2013, p. 850, 868. 
85 AMERASINGHE, Chittharanjan F. Evidence in International Litigation. Leiden, 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005, p. 164.
86 KLAMBERG, Mark. Evidence in International Criminal Trials. Leiden: Brill, 
2013, p. 418.
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5. concluding rEMarks
The foregoing study has alluded to the importance of admissibility 
of evidence in the context of international criminal proceedings. Despite 
some problems presented above, the judicial practice has generally struck 
the necessary balance between ensuring the fair trial requirements and 
managing the judicial proceedings in a sometime stormy navigation 
between the inquisitorial and adversarial elements, while maintaining 
the character of an international judicial body. 
The attention paid to admissibility of evidence distinguishes 
international criminal justice from traditional international courts 
and tribunals with their natural inclination to flexible procedural and 
evidentiary frameworks. 
All in all, the general position of international criminal justice 
towards admissibility of evidence proves similar to the general flexibility 
of the proceedings and struggle to establish truth by the majority of 
(if not all) international courts and tribunals. The attempt to “install a 
flexible law of the evidence in a predominantly adversarial trial under 
the current demands of international criminal justice” may be considered 
“at the very least a highly dubious undertaking”87 but it should be borne 
in mind that any such hybridization of the procedure has been possible 
and effective. It has indeed been successfully taking place for decades 
now, due to the utmost care exercised by judges, even if their direct 
influence on procedural law, and evidentiary issues in particular, has 
been considerably diminished by the Rome Statute.
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